Pier-André Bouchard St-Amant

Chercheur postdoctoral, INET
À compter de septembre, je serai chercheur invité à l'Université Cambridge.
Mon courriel: pabsta {at} gmail {dot} com (clé PGP).
Curriculum Vitae.

Publication récente:

Optimal Redistributive Pensions with Temptation and Costly Self-Control.
International Tax and Public Finances
Co-écrit avec Jean-Denis Garon.

Intérêts de recherche

  1. Économie des réseaux
  2. Microéconomie
  3. Économie publique

Cahier de recherche

  1. Network Rigidities and the Business Cycle


    I explore the impact of the network structure of trade on business cycles using a simple model of production. In particular, how much amplification and co-movements does the network structure generate? I show that the network amplifies the volatility of production, generates a common business cycle and increases the volatility of prices. I also explore what is the best way to reduce the impact of network shocks through production stabilization of a given region. I find that the optimal tax base should include all regions directly or indirectly trading with such region.

    Using data on the flow of commodities between american states, I test the predictions of the model and find results in line with the theory. I also use the model to estimate the probability of contagion between states using California and Texas as the ``epicenter'' of a downward shock. The network effect increases the probability of a downturn in direct trading states by 6%. Using world data, I argue that an Eurotax would be preferable to a local tax to insure against Greek downturns.

    JEL CODES: L14, E32, E17, F17.

  2. Getting the Right Spin: A Theory of Value of Social Networks

    (Soumis pour évaluation. PDF)

    I develop a theory that answers the two following questions: what is the best word-of-mouth campaign that a company can perform on a social network and second, what is the value of such a campaign? I answer these questions with the assumption that users choose from whom they listen to. The optimal solution selects a Nash Equilibria where a small group of users is targeted. Such solution reproduces patterns of contagion that have been observed in empirical studies. The value of a network can be decomposed into three components: the value of the word-of-mouth campaign, the value of the choices made by users given this campaign and finally, the social value of the network. Such a theory allows one to price companies that own social networks like Facebook. The theory suggests that advertising investments in users should be proportional to the discounted influence they have, where the influence of a user is measured as the number of users who choose to listen to him. An algorithm to compute the optimal solution is presented.

    JEL Codes: L1, D83, D85.

  3. University Funding Policies: Buildings or Citizens?

    (Soumis pour évaluation. PDF)

    Governments fund public universities based on the number of registered students and lump sum transfers. Such policy induces universities to compete for student recruitment. I show that such rule can lead to an inefficient allocation of resources in which universities compete for the same students. I suggest a more efficient policy that achieves the social optimum for any given level of funding. Such funding rule should not be solely based on university's own enrolement, but also on enrolment in competing universities.

    JEL Codes: H52, I23, I28.

  4. Externalities, Social Value and Word of Mouth: Notions of Public Economics on Networks

    (Soumis pour évaluation. PDF)

    I examine an environment where advertisers can "seed" word-of-mouth advertising by providing initial information to specific users of a social network. Discussion over a social network generates spillover effects for firms when consumers can use the social network to inform each other. When a firm can exploit a social network's structure, it can increase its sales. However, when the network formation process is costly, firms free-ride on such costs at the expense of agents on the network. Even if agents can form coalitions and ask for payments, I show that they cannot recoup the value of this externality.

    When users actively modify the information, generating word-of-mouth advertising about a product provides a "social value." This social value stems from the discussions that agents have about the product, without any intervention. Since this process occurs regardless of the firm's actions, the firm cannot capture such valuation. The opinion leaders, or highly regarded agents on the network, play a key role in the formation of this social value.

    JEL Codes: L1, D83, D85.

Projets de recherche en cours

  1. University Funding Rules and Research Performance (avec Louis-François Brodeur)
  2. Optimal Redistributive Age-Dependent Taxation and Human Capital (avec Louis Perrault)